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I. INTRODUCTION
Transracial adoption is a sensitive topic, evoking acrimonious debate
"between those who view transracial placements as positive for both the
children and society as a whole and those who view them as injurious to
Black children and Black communities."' Efforts to declare race-matching
preference policies or statutory schemes unconstitutional are intensifying.2
Some legal writers assert that such a prohibition is needed in order to avoid
or minimize harm to Black3 youngsters in the foster care system.4 In a re-
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1. Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subor-
dination, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 33, 34 (1993-94). While Perry focuses exclusively
on adoptions of Black children by white adults, any adoption in which the adoptive parent
and child are of different racial backgrounds may be referred to as a transracial adoption. Id.
at 34 n.1.
2. See Carol J. Castaneda, Colorblind Love: Whites Winning Fight to Adopt Black Kids; Cross-
ing the Racial Line Has Its Costs, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 1990, at Al (describing successful suits
against state restriction of transracial adoptions brought in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsyl-
vania, many aided by the National Coalition to End Racism in America's Child Care System);
see, e.g., Committee to End Racism in Mich.'s Child Care Sys. v. Mansour, 12 Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA) 1285 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (issuing consent decree not to discriminate in transracial adop-
tions by foster parents); Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (declaring
prohibition against transracial adoption unconstitutional). But see, e.g., In re Welfare of D.L.,
486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 603 (1992) (affirming Black grandparents'
adoption instead of adoption by white foster parent who had cared for biracial child for two
years).
3. It should be noted that, like Professor Perry, I capitalize the word Black, except when
directly quoting another person. See Perry, supra note 1, at 34 n.2 (quoting Kimberld W.
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1331 n.2 (1988) (stating that "Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other
'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural group and, [thus] require denotation as a proper
noun")); see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 4 n.12 (1991) (stating that Black should be capitalized because it "has deep political and
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cent law review article analyzing the same-race statutory preference schemes
of three states, the commentator concluded that "a child affected by the
question of trans-racial adoption is potentially trapped in the middle of dan-
gerous political and legal crossroads."'
Race and color continue to be unresolved issues in our soci-
ety-inextricably tied and merged with issues of power, status, and inequali-
ty-that mock American claims of being a democratic land of equal opportu-
nity.6 Race and color profoundly influence the lives of all within our society,
governing the choices one makes and the choices one believes she has.7 Is-
sues of race and poverty in American society directly contribute to the dis-
proportionate numbers8 of Black children remaining in the foster care sys-
social meaning as a liberating term").
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Match-
ing in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1248 (1991).
5. David S. Rosettenstein, Trans-racial Adoption and the Statutory Preference Schemes: Before
the "Best Interests" and After the "Melting Pot," 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 137, 197 (1994) (arguing
that statutory preference schemes of Arkansas, California, and Minnesota are unlikely to sur-
vive if submitted to strict scrutiny). In Professor Rosettenstein's opinion:
[R]ace-based adoption preference schemes should be viewed as highly problematic
devices employed in a politically contentious environment .... The schemes endow
the social service infrastructure with substantial discretionary decision-making author-
ity when the premise for the exercise of that authority is race and the adequacy of
legal review is open to question.
Id.
6. See generally A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (Gerald D. Jaynes &
Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989); JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM:
THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE (1994); JOHN H. FRANKLIN, THE COLOR LINE: LEGACY
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1993); ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE,
SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992); LURE AND LOATHING: ESSAYS ON RACE, IDENTITY, AND
THE AMBIVALENCE OF ASSIMILATION (Gerald Early ed., 1993); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (20th Anniversary ed. 1962);
CORNEL WEST, RACE MATrERS (1993).
7. The following excerpt from a front page story in a recent Boston Sunday Globe is illus-
trative:
LEXINGTON - Around suppertime last January, Gerri Weathers' car stalled on a
residential street in this town where she has lived for nearly 20 years.
Instead of ringing a stranger's doorbell, the management consultant who is
active in community affairs trudged 2 miles in the dark and bitter cold to a public
telephone.
"That's right, I did, because I wouldn't take that risk," Weathers said. "Being
a woman doesn't matter. I'm an African-American, and I wasn't sure how I'd be
received."
Lynda Gorov, Lexington Reexamines Strength Of Its Diversity, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Nov. 13,
1994, at 1.
8. SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, No PLACE TO CALL HOME: DIS-
CARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, H.R. REP. No. 395, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1990) (per-
centage of minority children in foster care rose from 41% in 1985 to 46% in 1988, more than
twice the percentage of minority children in national child population). In Massachusetts, of
the 4606 youths free for adoption in the custody of the Department of Social Services "2,003,
or about 43 percent, are white; 1,546, or about 34 percent, are black; 685, or about 15 percent,
are Hispanic; and 372, or about 8 percent are from other ethnic groups." Efrain Hernandez,
Jr., Striving for Balance; Agency Addresses Minorities' Complaints on Adoption Process, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 7, 1993, at 17, 23.
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tem for longer periods of time than other children,9 due to a shortage of ap-
proved Black adoptive homes."
I believe that race cannot be ignored." The key to successful living as
a minority person in a discriminating, denigrating society is to have positive
affiliations with others like oneself, from whom one can gain support and
affirmation, and can learn coping skills. 2 Most individuals are not "color-
blind"; skin color and perceptions of racial difference trigger within the
beholder unconscious stereotypical expectations and assumptions which then
often govern any ensuing social interactions. 3 Thus, to promote and protect
a child's "best interests," race is an important factor to be considered when
evaluating the appropriateness of prospective adoptive parents. Does the
person have the awareness, capacity, and sensitivity to prepare the nonwhite
child to handle the challenges that will be encountered because of the child's
racial appearance? 4 Advocates for transracial adoption who naively espouse
a "Love conquers all" philosophy" may represent an assault on the Black
9. See infra note 72 and text accompanying notes 134-36.
10. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 4, at 1188, 1235; Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption:
Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 513-14 (1984). But cf. ROB-
ERT B. HILL ET AL., RESEARCH ON THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILY: A HoUsTIC PERSPECTIVE 33
(1993) ("[Tlhe National Urban League's Black Pulse Survey revealed that three million (or
one-third of) black household heads were interested in formally adopting a black child.");
infra part IV.C.1.
11. The reader should note that my views have been shaped by twentieth century life
experiences in the United States as a Black, African-American woman-daughter, wife, mother,
grandmother, and foster parent: professional training in graduate social work during the mid-
1950s, the role of a community activist in the 1960s, legal studies during the 1970s, and
strong career and personal commitments to furthering the "best interests" of children, espe-
dally those of Black youth.
12. See Jacinda T. Townsend, Reclaiming Self-Determination: A Call for Intraracial Adoption, 2
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 173, 177 (No. 1 1995).
13. For an example of a classic study documenting this phenomenon, see Pamela C.
Rubovits & Martin L. Maehr, Pygmalion Black and White, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
210 (1973) (suggesting explanation of why teachers are often unable to equalize performance
levels of Blacks and whites). This study involved the systematic observation of teacher behav-
ior following experimental manipulation of expectations-teachers were told that certain stu-
dents were "gifted" or "nongifted." Teachers gave preferential treatment to students labeled
"gifted" and, to some extent, the pattern of treatment was dependent on the race of the stu-
dents. "In general, black students were treated less positively than whites, with blacks labeled
'gifted' apparently subjected to more discrimination than those labeled 'nongifted.'" Id. at 210.
Moreover, the observed teacher behavior indicated that the most demanding teachers, "while
encouraging whites, tended to ignore blacks." Id.
14. For a sensitive and insightful discussion of these challenges, see MAUREEN T. REDDY,
CROSSING THE COLOR LINE: RACE, PARENTING, AND CULTURE (1994) (autobiographical narrative
of white feminist raising two children in an interracial marriage). In her preface, Reddy de-
scribes her book. "[I]t is about whiteness, about trying to cross the color line at many plac-
es ... about the politics of feminism and antiracism, about loving blackness ... about
mothering black children in a society that does not value children, and particularly does not
value black children." Id. at xiii-iv.
15. See Perry, supra note 1, at 62 (discussing differing views about "love conquers all"
philosophy); Memorandum from Randall Kennedy, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, to
Colleagues (Nov. 3, 1993) (on file with author) (requesting an immediate response from per-
sons willing to join with him in opposing the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1993 (S.1224)).
Professor Kennedy wrote:
134 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY
family and Black community that is as dangerous as some recent Supreme
Court decisions 6 that seem to herald an end to the gains of the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1960s. 7
In her article analyzing the nature of the discourse about transracial
adoption, Professor Twila L. Perry states that her intent is to contribute to a
constructive dialogue about transracial adoption. 8 She invites not only con-
tinued discussion and examination of the sensitive and complex issues sur-
rounding transracial adoption, but a broader consideration of the needs and
interests of all Black children. 9
This Essay is a response to Perry's call. The following key questions are
considered. Whose interests would be served if consideration of race were
completely eliminated from adoptive placement decision-making? What really
drives the growing momentum to eliminate race considerations from all
adoptive placement decisions? What would be the consequences of eliminat-
ing same-race placement preferences for a particular Black adoptee, for the
There is simply no compelling reason to delay even briefly, for the purpose of ra-
cial matching, placing a parentless child in a permanent home. What parentless
children need most are not "white" parents or "black" parents or "yellow" parents
but loving parents who will provide them with a nurturing environment.
Id. at 2.
Contrary to the view held by Kennedy, one adoption consultant, discussing how de-
cisions are made about what child to adopt, bluntly declares:
Most infertile people aren't adopting out of any political motivation. They are
adopting in order to become parents! It is easy for couples desperate to adopt a
child to make an idealistic leap of faith. "A child is a child. Kids grow better in
families, and these are kids without families. Give me this child to love."
The reality of transracial or transethnic adoption is really much different. Love
does not conquer all. The problems inherent in interracial dating or interracial mar-
riage are also a part of interracial adoption. In either case, the result is a multiracial
or biracial family.
PATRICIA I. JOHNSTON, ADOPTING AFTER INFERTILITY 128 (1992).
16. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993) (holding that North Carolina
majority-minority voting district of "dramatically irregular" shape, absent sufficient race-neutral
explanation for its boundaries, may be unconstitutional and violate rights of white voters); St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (setting out requirements that make it
more difficult to prove job discrimination due to race, gender, or religious prejudice); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding state and local programs designed
to benefit minority groups subject to strict constitutional scrutiny and constitutionally justifi-
able only if designed to remedy prior discrimination). These decisions represent what one
court observer, writing at the end of the 1992-93 term, described as a trend that "emerged
slowly . . . but [which leaves] little doubt today that the nation's highest court has virtually
abandoned the idea of giving minorities preferential treatment to help end racial inequality."
Dick Lehr, High Court Backs Off Race-Based Preferences, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, July 11, 1993, at
1.
17. See infra note 115.
18. Perry, supra note 1, at 39.
19. Id. at 108.
20. In my opinion, the true costs or consequences of being a transracial adoptee cannot
be assessed until an individual attains adulthood. The studies that have been done over the
past two and a half decades only report on adoptees through late adolescence and into their
early twenties. Most studies conclude "that children are not detrimentally affected by being
raised by parents of a different race." Id. at 37. However, Perry notes the contradiction that
"virtually all of the researchers conclude that children should be placed for adoption with
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status and integrity of the Black family and Black community,21 and for
American society generally?'
Part II of this Essay summarizes Perry's article in which she poses the
question: Is the transracial adoption debate about the needs of Black children
or "the right of white people to parent whichever children they choose?"'
In Part II, I assert that the transracial adoption debate is more about adults
seeking to establish a right to parent than about meeting the needs of Black
children. Various factors currently fueling efforts to eliminate race consider-
ations from all adoptions are identified. Part IV recognizes two important
paradigm shifts in the field of adoption: a shift in the focus of the adoption
process and a change in the dominance among adoption professionals. The
new challenges for social work and legal professionals posed by these para-
digm shifts are also discussed.
This Essay concludes with a summary consideration of the meaning of
these changes for Black children, the Black family, and the Black community.
Professional practitioners and policy makers are urged to shift from analyz-
ing the discourse about transracial adoption to developing culturally sensi-
families of the same race whenever possible." Id. (citing OwEN GIL & BARBARA JACKSON,
ADOPTION AND RACE: BLACK, ASIAN AND MIXED RACE CHILDREN IN WHITE FAMILIES 139-40
(1983); LUCILLE J. GROW & DEBORAH SHAPIRO, BLACK CHILDREN, WHITE PARENTS: A STUDY OF
TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 239 (1974); RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTEES AND THEIR FAMILIES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY AND COMMITMENT 142 (1987)). See also
Arnold R. Silverman, Outcomes of Transracial Adoption, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993,
at 104, 108-14 (adoption issue) (describing three outcome studies published since 1983 that
assessed family integration, self-esteem, school performance, racial identity, and overall adjust-
ment of adoptees placed at an early age and included a comparison group).
21. See GIL & JACKSON, supra note 20, at 4-5, 130-38. In a study dealing with transracial
placements in England, these authors recognize the need for more research to address the
criticism of transracial adoption as discrimination against the Black community:
Not only have black families suffered from the material hardship which is likely to
produce pressures and tensions in child-care, but also white welfare agencies have
in many cases developed a stigmatising view of the character and capacities of the
black family .... The black community has every justification for seeing itself as a
'donor' of children for white couples. Such a perception can do little for the dignity
and self-determination of that community. To have a system which through 'benign
neglect' in effect systematically removes black children from black homes and places
them in white homes without any traffic in the opposite direction can hardly be
beneficial for the black community.
Id. at 137. Moreover, they conclude:
[T]ransracial adoption, through the mechanisms of the "adoption market" has repre-
sented the traditional servicing of whites by blacks, in this context by providing
children for them. Secondly, that transracial placements take from the black commu-
nity what must be seen as ultimately their most valuable resource-their children.
And, third, that the black community cannot hope to maintain its pride and dignity
if advantage is defined for them by these placements as being brought up by white
families. Somehow, on these grounds alone, the impetus for finding black homes has
to be maintained and increased.
Id. at 138. While this was an English study, I believe that these concerns and observations are
directly applicable to child welfare practices in the United States.
22. Is the country ready to accept not only a blending of all our ethnic differences into
one "melted pot," but also a resulting "Browning of America"? See discussion infra part I,
regarding trends in interracial marriage, dating, and multiracial births.
23. Perry, supra note 1, at 107.
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tive services and strategies to meet the needs of the growing number of
Black children in foster care.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF PERRY'S ARTICLE ABOUT
THE TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION CONTROVERSY
Perry analyzes the discourse about transracial adoption in a scholarly
manner, providing a timely, valuable addition to the legal literature. Writing
with candor, clarity, and authority, Perry demonstrates an awareness that
some may not be readily disposed to accept her analysis.24 Her focus on
how the transracial adoption controversy may affect the adopted children
and the communities from which they come leaves at least two important
tasks for others: answering the question of where Black children belong
and assessing the constitutionality of same-race placement.'
Perry offers scholars a useful framework for understanding differing
positions and views about transracial adoption. Her conceptual paradigm
posits two distinctly different perspectives-liberal colorblind individualism'
and color and community consciousness.' "These two perspectives go far be-
yond transracial adoption; they represent different approaches to the basic
analysis of race and racism in America."29 Perry argues that aspects of the
24. Perry noted:
A meaningful discussion requires the disclosure of seldom discussed, often pro-
foundly personal, feelings about racial relationships at both intimate and political
levels. Thus, a discussion of transracial adoption may require us to write or say out
loud some of those things that are probably more often discussed in hushed tones
in small, racially homogenous groups.
Advocates of transracial adoption may feel attacked and believe that their
well-intentioned efforts toward a nonracist society are unappreciated by the intended
beneficiaries. On the other hand, members of minority groups whose children are
being adopted may feel they are being lectured about their own interests by persons
who neither share their circumstances nor understand their lives and history.
Id. at 38.
25. See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 1163.
26. See Rosettenstein, supra note 5, at 137.
27. According to Perry, the dominant features of liberal colorblind individualism are: (1) a
belief that racism in this country can be completely eradicated; (2) acceptance of
colorblindness as the ideal societal goal--"race should not be an important factor in evaluat-
ing individuals;" and yet, (3) the individual is considered to be "the primary unit for the
analysis of rights and interests." Perry, supra note 1, at 43.
28. In contrast, the salient features of the color and community consciousness perspective
are: (1) a view that racism is pervasive and a permanent part of American society; (2) recog-
nition that race profoundly influences the lives of individuals-both in terms of the choices
they make and the choices they believe they have; (3) a multicultural society, requiring the
continued existence of diverse cultures, is valued; and (4) an emphasis on "the rights and
interests of the group with which the individual is identified . . . [reflecting] a strong belief
in the interrelationship between the subordination of a group as a whole and the oppression
of the individuals within that group." Id.
29. Id. at 38. Perry attributes the two differing perspectives on transracial adoption that
she identifies to peop!e in our society having very different racial histories or narratives. Id.
"Racial narratives" are shaped by a combination of factors: (1) the actual history of the racial
group to which a person belongs; (2) an individual's perception of that history which may or
may not comport with reality; and (3) an individual's perception of the extent to which race
affects one's life on a day-to-day basis. See id. at 47-53.
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perspective of liberal colorblind individualism, "however well-inten-
tioned, ... may actually reinforce the subordination of Black people in gen-
eral and Black children in particular .... Moreover, the discourse of color-
blind individualism, ostensibly about individual rights and interests, often re-
flects the exercise of power by whites as a dominant group."' °
Language can be powerful; it can evoke negative images and stereo-
types that harm those who are discussed." Perry strongly chides scholars
"from the colorblind perspective [who] advocate the adoption of Black chil-
dren by whites but do not argue that white children should be dispersed
and isolated in Black families, schools, or other institutions in Black commu-
nities in order to further the goal of integration."" Perry draws an interest-
ing comparison between the colorblind liberal perspective on transracial
adoption and the school desegregation process of the 1950s and 1960s; "[in
both situations, Black children [are] removed from Black communities and
placed into white communities allegedly to benefit both the individual chil-
dren and the society."' Clearly, de jure segregation-an official wrong
predicated on a belief in Black inferiority-affronted "the dignity and hu-
manity of Black people... [however, forty years later,] desegregation of the
public schools [has yet to] lead to racial equality."' Some scholars have rec-
ognized that school desegregation resulted in losses and negative side effects
for Black children and the Black community, such as the dosing of many
Black educational institutions and the decline in the number of teaching and
administrative positions held by Blacks.'
While Perry seems to concede that school desegregation was "a neces-
sary step for practical or symbolic social progress for Blacks," she is un-
willing to view transracial adoption in the same light. She states instead that
"[tihe emphasis on placing Black children in white homes raises the concern
that less emphasis is being placed on strengthening Black homes .... [Tihe
30. Id. at 40. I wonder how Perry's thesis will be received by people whose perspectives
and racial narrative histories differ. Some readers may be so arrogant and possess such a
sense of superiority or entitlement to be, in the words of Johnston, like "[m]ost well educated
North Americans of European heritage . . . completely unaware of the extent of racism in
this culture." JOHNSTON, supra note 15, at 128. They might be considered "unconsciously in-
competent" within an adult learning model used to address racial issues. Id. The model posits
progressive movement "from unconscious incompetence to conscious incompetence to con-
scious competence to unconscious competence." Id.
31. For instance, "conceptualiz[ing] transracial adoption as a one-way street where whites
adopt Black children, but Blacks do not adopt white children," Perry, supra note 1, at 41,
implicitly "promotes a view that the Black community is invisible, powerless, and irrelevant
to the determination of policies that affect Black children." Id. at 79-80.
32. Id. at 106. "Integration ideally involves people of different ethnic groups, living, learn-
ing, or working together in an environment in which no group exercises disproportionate
power." Id. at 106 n.324.
33. Id. at 105.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 105 nn.319-24 (citing DERRICK A. BELL, Neitier Separate Schools Nor Mixed
Schools: The Chronicle of the Sacrificed Black School Children, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 102
(1987); Drew S. Days, IH, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV.
53, 55-56 (1992)).
36. Perry, supra note 1, at 105.
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key to changing the conditions of Black people lies in strengthening Black
communities and families, as opposed to token desegregation into the white
world."37
Perry concludes her discourse analysis by noting sadly that it is in the
context of transracial adoption that a significant debate over the welfare of
Black children is occurring:
[If only such energy could be spent] improving the material circumstances
that so profoundly affect the welfare of the vast majority of Black children
who will continue to be raised in Black families in Black communities. This
raises the question of whether the transracial adoption debate is really about
the interests of Black children at all, or is instead about the right of white
people to parent whichever children they choose.'
In the next section, the transracial adoption controversy is redefined as being
about the right of white adults to adopt whichever children they select, and
not about the needs of Black children.
II. THE TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION CONTROVERSY REDEFINED
A. What Is the Real Issue: The Interests of Black Children or the Rights of
White Adults to Adopt Whichever Children They Choose?
From my perspective,39 the transracial adoption debate is about estab-
lishing a new right or entitlement for certain white adults who wish to be-
come parents by any means they select.' Proponents of transracial adoption
who claim that same-race placement preferences are victimizing the increas-
ing numbers of Black children in foster care are employing a diversionary
"smokescreen" strategy. This smokescreen obfuscates important systemic
problems and creates additional barriers to meeting the needs of Black chil-
dren, Black families, and the Black community.4 The focus of attention
37. Id. at 105 n.324. Desegregation does not create integration, see supra note 32, if it is
merely a one-way street process in which Blacks seek acceptance by whites, but not vice-ver-
sa. In that instance, the result is mere tokenism rather than whites acquiring any increased
level of comfort with the diverse, multicultural society that this nation is becoming.
38. Perry, supra note 1, at 107.
39. For experiences influencing my perspective, see supra note 11.
40. Others have also concluded that "transracial adoption primarily serves the interests of
white families, not the interests of ... black children." Howard, supra note 10, at 510.
Howard states that:
Transracial adoption was defined originally not as a program to salvage black
children from the effects of foster placement or institutionalization, but as a way of
fulfilling the needs of childless white couples, given the dwindling availability of
white children. Thus[,] it was seen as a white enterprise instituted for the advantage
of the white community.
Id. at 510 n.29 (quoting RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 46
(1977)). Howard also states that "[a]t first, the main criticism [of transracial adoption] was
that it primarily benefited white families and only served to divert attention from the needs
of the larger number of blaclZ children who would not be adopted by whites in any event."
Id. (quoting Jacqueline Macaulay & Stewart Macaulay, Adoption for Black Children: A Case Study
of Expert Discretion, in 1 RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 265, 286 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1978)).
41. See supra note 21. Arguably, there is something very disingenuous about the way
proponents of transracial adoption constantly refer to the plight of Black children in foster
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should be shifted from the illusory debate about the merits of transracial
adoption to the real issue: whether it is appropriate to establish new rights
for adults seeking to adopt children.
In this Essay, no attempt is made to assess the outcomes of transracial
adoption. Rather, given the racial realities of the mid-1990s, this Essay ana-
lyzes how eliminating same-race placement preferences in order to establish
a new right for white adults affects Black children, Black families, and the
Black community generally. In this regard, perceptions may be as important
as reality. For example, what are the consequences when proponents of
transracial adoption cast those who oppose it-such as the National Associa-
tion of Black Social Workers' (NABSW)-as the "bad guy" or "heavy" in
the drama? Has the NABSW, in reaffirming its 1972 policy opposing
transracial adoption, been merely "political" and "group serving"?43 I think
not. Indeed, I believe that they are astutely aware of what Black children
care when, in fact, most whites who seek to adopt look for healthy infants, not older children
with a range of "special needs," and most of the growing number of transracial placements
being made today involve newborns or babies. See Judith K. McKenzie, Adoption of Children
with Special Needs, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 62 (adoption issue) (discussing
past history and current placement issues); infra text accompanying notes 62-76.
42. At its first national convention in 1972, NABSW passed a resolution strongly opposing
transracial adoption. Subsequently, NABSW issued a Position Paper, declaring in part:
[W]e have taken the position that Black children should be placed only with Black
families whether in foster care or for adoption.... Human beings are products of
their environment and develop their sense of values, attitudes and self-concept with-
in their family structures. Black children in white homes are cut off from the
healthy development of themselves as Black people.
The socialization process for every child begins at birth. Included in the social-
ization process is the child's cultural heritage which is an important segment of the
total process. This must begin at the earliest moment; otherwise our children will
not have the background and knowledge which is necessary to survive in a racist
society. This is impossible if the child is placed with white parents in a white envi-
ronment.
Position Paper from the National Ass'n of Black Social Workers (Apr. 1972), reprinted in SI-
MON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 40, at 50. For further discussion regarding NABSW's steadfast
opposition to transracial adoption, see Perry, supra note 1, at 42, 46-48.
It should be noted that in professional groups, many Black Caucuses first met during
the late 1960s and 1970s. Some groups established new incorporated bodies; others remained
within their parent groups but asserted the right to meet as a special interest subgroup.
Shortly after the first NABSW convening session in 1972, a National Conference on
Black Sociologists was held on May 5-6, 1972, at the University of Chicago. This conference
was held in the belief that the increasing polarization, &ident at the 1969 and 1970 American
Sociology Association annual meetings in San Francisco and Washington, D.C., could be
checked if a way were found to bridge the knowledge gap between Black and white sociolo-
gists about each other. See BLACK SOCIOLOGISTS: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES
vii-ix (James E. Blackwell & Morris Janowitz eds., 1974).
One can only speculate where the field of adoption might be today, if the intense feel-
ings of alienation and disregard felt by Black social workers had been acknowledged and ad-
dressed within the professional organization of the National Association of Social Workers,
Inc.
43. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 4, at 1248 (characterizing NABSW position in support of
racial matching policies as "promoting an inappropriate separatist agenda"). But cf. Perry,
supra note 1, at 46 (describing NABSW position as "the most vivid expression of the color
and community consciousness perspective").
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need in order to grow up to be successful, contributing adults in American
society.
The realization that the focus of the transracial adoption controversy is
not the needs and interests of Black children, but instead the interests of
prospective adoptive parents, has an important implication. The needs of
Black children will not be better served until our society honestly and pub-
licly acknowledges race and color as defining influences. Stated another way,
Black children will not benefit until we reverse the current "retreat from
race"" and commit ourselves to addressing and redressing past and present
inequities. Action is needed, not just at the level of individual morality, but
rather at the institutional, community, and societal levels. We must commit
ourselves to developing, implementing, and supporting policies and pro-
grams that enhance successful continuation of a democratic society in which
all citizens enjoy equal opportunities to reap the rewards of "life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness."45
B. Discussion
The basis for my position that the transracial adoption controversy is
not about the needs and interests of Black children requires further explana-
tion. I have based this position on data and on inferences drawn from vari-
ous materials reviewed: available statistics on adoption,4 reported develop-
ments and trends in the adoption field,' and demographic data and sur-
44. See, e.g., DANA Y. TAKAGI, THE RETREAT FROM RACE: ASIAN-AMERICAN ADMISSIONS
AND RACIAL POLTICS (1992). In this book, one finds a chilling forecast for what seems to be
unfolding with respect to discrediting same-race placement preferences in adoption. Takagi's
discussion of the December, 1990 move against race-exclusive scholarships by Department of
Education staffer Michael Williams, is most telling:
Williams's blundered solo attempt to nix race-exclusive scholarships was a
stunning example of • . .what I call the retreat from race. In terms of social policy,
the defining characteristic of this trend has been an increasing reluctance-by both
liberals and conservatives-to address contemporary racial problems with explicitly
racial solutions .... A similar shift has occurred in political discussions of welfare
and civil rights policy. Liberals and conservatives alike propose that race-based poli-
cies be abandoned in favor of class-based or race-neutral policies.
Id. at 173-74; see also supra note 16. °
45. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Instead of spouting empty
rhetoric about a return to "family values," we must find a way to create a truly level playing
field for all. This means providing sound, affordable housing for all groups in communities
where children have the opportunity to acquire the skills that prepare them to hold jobs
paying enough to permit them, in turn, to house and educate their own children. See DOUG-
LAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING
OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (systematic study of racial and ethnic segregation based on 1980
census).
46. See generally NATIONAL COMMITrEE FOR ADOPTION, 1989 ADOPTION FACIZOOK: UNITED
STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES (1989) [hereinafter NCFA FACrBOOK]; Chris-
tine A. Bachrach et al., Relinquishment of Premarital Births: Evidence from National Survey Data,
24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 27 (1992); Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 26 (adoption issue).
47. See generally NCFA FACTBOOK, supra note 46; NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. FOR
CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ADOPTION OF CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL
NEEDS: ISSUES IN LAW AND POUCY (Ellen C. Segal ed., 1985); Symposium, Adoption, 72 CHILD
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veys,4 including statistics compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.49
Since 1972, statistics demonstrate that the total pool of American children
readily available for adoption has changed significantly, both in size and
composition.' Furthermore, if one looks back over four decades of adoption
practices to the early 1950s, one discovers that there have been notable
changes in how adoptions are arranged. These changes raise interesting
questions about how best to allocate roles and responsibilities between child
welfare and legal professionals5 '
1. Adoption Statistics. Although exact numbers are not known, it is
generally agreed that annual finalized adoptions in the United States-in
contrast to "informal" arrangements that are never legalized-peaked at
about 175,000 in 1970, dropped to about 104,088 in 1986, and rose to a re-
ported 118,529 in 1990' Formal adoptions include both related adoptions
and unrelated adoptions. Related adoptions refer to stepparent adoptions and
adoptions by a nonparent relative. In an unrelated adoption, a nonrelative
adopts the child.'
Related adoptions totaled 91,141 in 1982, but were down to 52,931 by
1986.0 This drop probably reflects a decrease in the number of stepparent
adoptions following remarriage, which in turn simply may mean that fewer
WELFARE 195 (1993); Symposium, Adoption, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 4.
48. See generally Martha F. Riche, We're All Minorities Now, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct. 1991,
at 26 (reporting on increase in numbers of interracial marriages and multiracial births);
Gabrielle Sindor, The "Other" Americans, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, June 1994, at 36 (describing
increase in number of Americans that do not fit into government's four racial categories).
49. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (1994).
50. These changes, however, are more a consequence of various social phenomena than a
reaction to the NABSW's strong opposition to transracial placements. See supra note 42. These
social phenomena include changes in the choices women tend to make about childbearing and
childrearing, shifts in attitudes about social behavior (such as the waning of the stigma tradi-
tionally attached to birth out of wedlock and single parenting), and increases in state inter-
vention into family affairs due to the growing public awareness of child abuse and neglect.
See, e.g., Howard, supra note 10, at 505-16. Stolley notes that today, fewer premarital concep-
tions are legitimated by marriage before birth. Additionally, with the continuing high rate of
divorce, single-parent families are so common today that "[ilt is estimated that at least one-
half of all children will spend part of their childhood in a single-parent family." Stolley, supra
note 46, at 32-33.
51. See infra Part IV.
52. Since 1975, the federal government has not collected any comprehensive, annual data
on adoptions. The American Public Welfare Association, with federal funding, has collected
national data on adoption and substitute care through the Voluntary Cooperative Information
System (VCIS) since 1983. This system, however, only covers those children who are in or
have passed through the public child welfare system. Stolley states a strong case for institut-
ing a comprehensive, nationwide, data-collection system, as well as a standardized reporting
system. Until these are in place, both policy makers and practitioners are handicapped in
their ability to deliver proper services. Stolley, supra note 46, at 38-40; see also NCFA
FACTBOOK, supra note 46, at iii-iv.
53. NCFA FACTBooK, supra note 46, at 69; Stolley, supra note 46, at 29.
54. Stolley, supra note 46, at 29. Adoption statistics can also be categorized according to
the arrangement or means of placement, whether via a public or private agency, or a private
independent intermediary. See id. at 30-31; text infra accompanying notes 77-80.
55. Stolley, supra note 46, at 29.
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stepparent families chose to formalize their parenting arrangements through
legal adoption." Unrelated adoptions, after reaching a high of 89,200 in
1971 and dropping to about 49,700 in 1974, have remained at or near 50,000
a year. 7 Since 1971, unrelated adoptions have comprised less than half of
all adoptions.'
2. Factors Affecting Unrelated Adoptions. Children become available for
adoption in one of two ways." Generally, newborns and infants are
available because birth parents voluntarily relinquish them to an adoption
agency for placement or specifically consent to another person's petition to
adopt their child.' Other children, mostly older, become available for adop-
tion because the parental rights of their parents are involuntarily terminated
by a court on grounds of abandonment or parental unfitness.61
The most dramatic development affecting the size and composition of
the domestic pool of children available for adoption, and hence the total
number of annual domestic adoptions, is the drastic decline in recent years
in the rate of unmarried mothers' voluntary relinquishments of their in-
fants.62 Before 1973, nine percent (approximately 36,000 annually) of all chil-
dren born to never-married women were relinquished for adoption; however,
during 1982-1988, voluntary relinquishments had dropped to two percent
(approximately 16,500 annually) of all non-marital births.' Most of this de-
cline is the result of a drastic drop in the rate of relinquishments by white,
unmarried women.
Before 1973, 19% of children born to never-married white women [approxi-
mately 33,269 each year] were placed for adoption, compared with 8%
[roughly 25,600 annually] in 1973-1981 and 3% [or approximately 13,000] in
1982-1988. Among never-married black women, fewer than 2% of children
were relinquished before 1973, and the rates do not appear to have changed
much since then.'
Moreover, the National Council for Adoption (NCFA), formerly the National
Committee for Adoption, indicates that nearly all infants born to unmarried
women are not relinquished.' As a result of the lack of available infants,
56. Id.
57. Id. at 29-30; NCFA FACTBooK, supra note 46, at 69.
58. NCFA FAcrEoOK, supra note 46, at 69.
59. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., 2 THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 21.2 (2d ed. 1987).
60. Id. § 21.5.
61. Id. § 21.7.
62. Bachrach et al., supra note 46, at 29 (reporting on analysis of data drawn from the
1982 and 1988 cycles of the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), which collects data
on the fertility and fertility-related behavior of U.S. women ages 1544); see infra table 1 at p.
143.
63. Bachrach et al., supra note 46, at 29.
64. Id.
65. The NCFA Factbook states that:
Infants comprised 48.1 percent of all unrelated domestic adoptions in 1986.
The 24,589 infant adoptions represented only 0.7 percent of all U.S. live births and
only 2.8 percent of all U.S. live births to unmarried women in that year. Since most
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TABLE 1. Among Children Born to Never-married
Women, Percentage Who Were Relinquished for
Adoption, by Race, According to Year of Birth
RACE BEFORE 1973- 1982-
1973 1981 1988
All women 8.7 4.1 2.0
Black 1.5 0.2 1.1
White 19.3 7.6 3.2
Source: Christine A. Bachrach et al., Relinquishment of Premarital Births:
Evidence from National Survey Data, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 27,29 thl. 1 (1992)
(percentages based upon combined data from 1982 and 1988 National
Surveys of Family Growth and refer to premarital births that had occurred
to women who were 15-44 years of age at either survey). Reproduced
with the permission of The Alan Guttmacher Institute.
foreign adoptions have become more attractive to many prospective adoptive
parents.6
The impact of the decline in the rate of relinquishments of white babies
is emphasized when two other phenomena are noted. First, the overall birth-
rate for unmarried mothers rose through the 1970s and most of the 1980s.'
Although there were more premarital births, "fewer children were placed for
adoption annually during the 1980s than in the 1970s."' Second, in the
mid-1990s with few healthy, white newborns being voluntarily relinquished,
the children legally free for adoption through public and many private agen-
cies are often either older youngsters with "special needs,"6' or infants who
infant adoptions are children relinquished by unmarried women, this indicates that
about 97 percent of babies born to unmarried women were kept by the mother.
NCFA FACTBOOK, supra note 46, at 4.
Furthermore, according to Stolley: "The vast majority of children placed for adoption
are, and traditionally have been, premarital births. According to the 1982 National Survey of
Family Growth (NSFG), 88% of all babies placed for adoption are born to never-married
mothers." Stolley, supra note 46, at 32.
66. Stolley, supra note 46, at 34 (stating that more than 60% of foreign adoptions in 1986
involved infants under one year of age). The NCFA Factbook reports 10,097 foreign adoptions.
in 1987, representing 16.4% of all unrelated adoptions. NCFA FAcTuooK, supra note 46, at 4-5.
67. Bachrach et al., supra note 46, at 29 ("Between 1970 and 1988, the birthrate for un-
married women rose from 26.4 to 38.6 births per 1,000 women, while the overall birthrate for
women aged 15-44 fell from 87.9 to 67.2 births per 1,000 women.").
68. Id.
69. For purposes of the federal adoption assistance program, a child is not deemed to be
a "child with special needs" unless:
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are born HIV positive or drug exposed. In all parts of the country, the total
population of Black children in foster care continues to grow at an alarming
rate." Not all of these children, however, are legally free for adoption. In
some instances, the case plan may not call for adoption, but rather a reunion
with the birth family.7 Many of those who are legally free are both older
and disabled.'
Not only is the size of the adoption pool smaller because of fewer relin-
quishments, the characteristics of the children now waiting for adoption has
changed. As one commentator has noted, "[mlost of them have experienced
some significant trauma in their young lives, including deprivation, physical
and sexual abuse, abandonment, loss, and many moves in foster care. As a
result, they are prone to emotional, behavioral, and learning problems."'
Perhaps because these children may be challenging to parent, special needs
adoptions constituted just over a quarter of all unrelated domestic adoptions
during most of the 1980s.'4 "[T]here is a desperate shortage of homes for
children with severe disabilities, older minority children, especially boys, and
(1) the State has determined that the child cannot or should not be returned to the
home of his parents; and
(2) the State had first determined (A) that there exists with respect to the child a
specific factor or condition (such as his ethnic background, age, or membership in a
minority or sibling group, or the presence of factors such as medical conditions or
physical, mental, or emotional handicaps) because of which it is reasonable to con-
clude that such child cannot be placed with adoptive parents without providing
adoption assistance . . . and (B) that, except where it would be against the best
interests of the child because of such factors as the existence of significant emotional
ties with prospective adoptive parents while in the care of such parents as a foster
child, a reasonable, but unsuccessful, effort has been made to place the child with
appropriate adoptive parents without providing adoption assistance under [this sec-
tion] ....
42 U.S.C. § 673(c) (1988). See Janet Mason & Carol W. Williams, The Adoption of Minority Chil-
dren: Issues in Developing Law and Policy, in ADOPTION OF CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS:
ISSUES IN LAW AND POLICY, supra note 47, at 83 (discussing special law and policy challenges
regarding Black and minority children); McKenzie, supra note 41, at 62.
Almost 60% of the children in the care of agencies who had finalized adoptions "had
one or more 'special needs' . . . which could result in their being more difficult to place for
adoption." Stolley, supra note 46, at 27, 34.
70. See supra note 8.
71. According to McKenzie:
In 1980, Public' Law 96-272, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act was
passed .... Underlying Public Law 96-272 is the premise that children develop best
in their own families and that most families can be preserved. State child welfare
agencies are required to make "reasonable efforts" (a term undefined in the original
statute) to prevent a child's placement and, if foster care becomes necessary, to
make efforts to reunite the family in a timely manner.
McKenzie, supra note 41, at 65.
72. See NCFA FACTBOoK, supra note 46, at 126 (stating that in 1986 at least 36,000 Black
children of an average age of nine years old who were legally free and waiting for adoption
were in foster care); id. at 176 (citing OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HuMAN SERvs., MINORITY ADOPTIONS (July 1988) (detailing barriers to placement of Black,
adoptable children, as identified through contacts with substantial number of adoption agen-
cies in five states)).
73. McKenzie, supra note 41, at 62; see also infra note 126.
74. In 1982, there were 14,005 special needs unrelated adoptions; in 1986, there were
13,568. See NCFA FACrBooK, supra note 46, at 62.
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large sibling groups."' Unfortunately, the families waiting to adopt "do not
match up" with these children. 6
3. Changing Placement Arrangements. Finally, if one looks back to the
1950s and compares adoptive placements then and now, one discovers some
important structural changes, as illustrated by Figure 1. In 1951, more than
half of all unrelated adoptions were arranged privately. These independent
arrangements were either brokered by a third party-doctor, attorney, mem-
ber of the clergy, or other person-or involved a direct placement by the
birth mother with the adopters. Only eighteen percent of unrelated adoptions
were through public agencies; private agencies handled less than a third of
all adoptions.'
After 1951, public agency placements slowly increased from eighteen
percent until they stabilized at about thirty-eight percent in 1972; private
agency unrelated adoptions peaked at forty percent in 1973.' The type of
placement arrangement that shifted most dramatically is the independent
private adoption. These dropped to a low of twenty-one percent in the early
1970s, reflecting "actions undertaken by states to clarify placement regula-
tions after groups such as the Child Welfare League of America expressed
concern over problems with independent adoptions."' By 1986, private in-
dependent adoptions accounted for 31.4% of all domestic unrelated adop-
tions (approximately 16,040), whereas thirty-nine percent of unrelated adop-
tions (about 20,064) were through public agencies, and private agencies han-
dled just under thirty percent (or 15,063).'
Given the changes in relinquishment patterns and the characteristics of
children waiting for adoption in the foster care system," it should not be a
surprise that more newborns are placed each year through independent
adoptions than through agencies, either private or public.' Because there is
no current comprehensive collection of annual adoption data at the national
level, the number of independent private adoptions may be significantly
undercounted.' Despite the lack of comprehensive data, three trends stand
75. McKenzie, supra note 41, at 72 (citing WESTAT, INC., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HU-
MAN SERVS., THE STUDY OF ADOPTION SERVICES FOR WAITING MINORITY AND NONMINORITY
CHILDREN (1986)).
76. Id. at 73.
77. Stolley, supra note 46, at 30.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 30-31. As early as 1950, a Yale Law Journal student comment focused on this
problem. Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE L.J.
715 (1950). Also, in 1955, "many sordid black market incidents were divulged during U.S.
Senate hearings led by Senator Kefauver." Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and
Laws 1958-1983, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173, 180 (1983) (citing, for example, Juvenile Delinquency (Inter-
state Adoption Practices-Miami, Florida): Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delin-
quency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955)).
80. NCFA FACrsOOK, supra note 46, at 3-4; Stolley, supra note 46, at 31.
81. See supra part III.B.2.
82. See, e.g., Mark T. McDermott, Agency Versus Independent Adoption: The Case for Indepen-
dent Adoption, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 146, 146 n.3 (adoption issue).
83. In addition, there are no current estimates on transracial adoption available. "Federally
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FIGURE 1: Placement Arrangements of Unrelated Adoptions, 1951-
1986 by Percentage
Source: Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN,
Spring 1993, at 26, 31 fig. 3 (adoption issue). Reproduced with the permission of The Center for
the Future of Children.
out. First, newborns and infants are the strong preference of first time adop-
tive parents, especially the infertile,' leading many to pursue an interna-
tional adoption.' Second, there is no strong demand for the growing num-
bers of older children with special needs.' Whether these children are
white or Black, it is difficult to find appropriate homes for them because of
published estimates on transracial adoption were last available in 1975. Yet, in that year, few-
er than half the states even reported data on transracial adoptions." Stolley, supra note 46, at
34. Furthermore, in reporting on data from the 1987 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS),
Stolley stated:
In only 8% of all adoptions are the parents and children of different rac-
es .... White women adopting black children accounted for 1% of all adoptions,
and white adoption of children of races other than white or black accounted for 5%
of all adoptions .... Because these estimates no doubt include foreign-born chil-
dren, the actual incidence of transracial adoption among children born in the United
States may be very low indeed.
McKenzie, supra note 41, at 72.
84. See McKenzie, supra note 41, at 72 ("Many of these [infertile] couples are seeking to
adopt a normal, healthy infant, but will 'settle' for a preschooler or possibly drug-exposed
infant.").
85. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 69.
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the challenges they pose for any prospective parent. Third, the decline in
voluntary relinquishments since 1973 is almost exclusively the result of a
drastic drop in relinquishments among white, never-married women.'
4. A New Phenomenon: Rise in Biracial Births. In addition to the above
data, other recent demographic trends provide a different backdrop for un-
derstanding the current drive to eliminate the factor of race from all adop-
tive placement considerations. There is a growing potential new source of
infants,. if the racial designation of "Black" is not attached to biracial in-
fants. 9 Many Americans are refusing t6 fit themselves into one of the Cen-
sus Bureau's four official racial categories." In the 1990 census, almost ten
million people refused to classify themselves as white, Black, Asian, or
American Indian.91 Commentators suggest that America may be poised to
experience some new patterns of interracial mixing, especially among young
people.' This argument contradicts Perry's conclusion that, based on a re-
view of past reported "low rates of interracial marriage in this country, it
appears that the vast majority of Americans, Black and white, have no burn-
ing desire to live in racially integrated families."93 Instead, "[i]n 1991, 74
percent of Americans said that interracial marriage was acceptable for them-
selves or others, according to the Roper Organization, up from 70 percent
who found it acceptable in 1986."'
87. See supra table 1 at p. 143 (rate among white, never-married women dropped from
19.3% to 3.2% between 1973 and 1988; rate among Black, never-married women remained
constant during same period at just over one percent).
88. See Sindor, supra note 48, at 38 ("[M]ixed-race children are . . .increasingly common,
because the penalties once attached to interracial dating and marriage are slowly fading
away.").
89. As the number of interracial marriages and mixed births continues to rise, "[miore
and more Americans are of mixed parentage, and they are demanding to be recognized as
multiracial." Riche, supra note 48, 32. In the first book ever to explore the lives of adult chil-
dren of Black/white unions, journalist Lise Funderburg states: "What numbers are available
only hint at how many of us are out there. Some population experts and multiracial support
networks estimate that there are currently at least one million mixed-race people in this coun-
try (of all mixes, not just black and white)." LISE FUNDERBURG, BLAcK, WHITE, OTHER: BIRA-
cIAL AMERIcANs TALK ABOUT RACE AND IDENTITY 11 (1994).
90. Sindor, supra note 48, at 38. Currently, the categories are (1) white, (2) Black, (3)
Asian or Pacific Islander, and (4) American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut, with the "catchall desig-
nator [of] 'Other.'" Tom Morganthau, What Color is Black?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 63, 65.
As part of its review of federal racial and ethnic classifications, the Office of Management
and Budget recently held in New York City the first of four public hearings to be conducted
around the country. Possible changes under consideration include addition of a classification
of "multiracial." See Steven A. Holmes, U.S. Urged to Reflect Wider Diversity in Racial and Eth-
nic Classifications, N.Y. TIMEs, July 8, 1994, at A18.
91. Sindor, supra note 48, at 36.
92. "Interracial dating has become a fact of life, according to a Times Orange County
[California] Poll of 500 unmarried people conducted in late June [of 1994]. Nearly 60% of
respondents 18 to 34 years old say they have dated someone from another racial or ethnic
group." Susan Christian, Young Don't Feel as Bound by Racial Lines, L.A. TIMES (Orange County
ed.), Sept. 12, 1994, at Al; see also Sdndor, supra note 48, at 36.
93. Perry, supra note 1, at 35-36.
94. Sindor, supra note 48, at 38.
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TABLE 2: Total Live Births to Black/White Parents and
Percentage of All Interracial Live Births, Compared with Total
Black/White Married Couples and Percentage of All Interracial
Married Couples (1990)
RACE BIRTHS MARRIAGES
Number -Percent Number Percent
Total Interracial 124,468 100 964,000 100
Total Black/White 49,479 39.8 211,000 21.9
Note: Table does not include births for which the race of the mother or father is unknown.
Source: BuREAu OF THE CENsus 56, tbl. 62 (1994); Gabrielle Sdndor The "Other" Americans.
Am. DEMOGRAPHICS, June 1994, at 36, 39.
Between 1970 and 1993, the number of interracial married couples al-
most quadrupled, growing from 310,000 in 1970 to almost 1.2 million in
1993.' 5 This represented an increase from less than one percent to more
than two percent of all reported married couples.96 Among interracial
married couples, the largest number, 920,000, were white/other race couples;
Black/white couples were only 242,000, or less than one out of five interra-
cial couples.' In contrast to the incidence of Black/white married couples,
forty percent of all multiracial births in 1990 (excluding births for which the
race of mother or father was unknown) were mixed Black and white, up
from thirty-two percent in 1970.9' According to the National Center for
Health Statistics (NCHS), which has tracked mixed race births since 1968,
"birthrates of children with one black and one white parent have been
climbing. In 1991, 52,232 such births were recorded, compared to 26,968 in
1981, and 8,758 in 1968." 99
In short, as Table 2 illustrates, the rate of Black/white births far exceeds
the number of Black/white marriages. Given the reported increase in the
adoption of mixed-race babies,"m it is reasonable to infer that many of
these babies are children born to unmarried couples who might be relin-
quished for adoption. Until such time as the Census Bureau amends its rules
and adds new racial categories, many of this growing group of mixed babies
will be deemed to be "Black." 10 Thus, I view the push to eliminate race
95. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 49, at 56 tbl. 62.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. Sindor, supra note 48, at 39.
99. FUNDERBURG, supra note 89, at 11.
100. McKenzie, supra note 41, at 72.
101. In a recent column discussing RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994), a controversial book on
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from placement considerations as a maneuver to enable whites who seek to
adopt infants to gain access to the growing number of nonmarital, mixed-
race children who may be relinquished for adoption, free of the constraints
imposed by same-race or same-culture placement preferences. Hence, I assert
that the transracial adoption controversy is not about addressing the needs of
the many older Black children who enter the foster care system; rather, it is
about giving preferences to certain white adults who seek to adopt infants.
Considering the fact that "African-American families throughout the country
are waiting to adopt infants and that African-American families adopt at a
rate of 4.5 times greater than European-American or Hispanic families," this
trend could be characterized as an attempt to garner the market in in-
fants102
IV. ADOPTION PARADIGM SHIFTS: A NEW Focus
AND NEW KEY PRoFEssIoNALs
As noted at the beginning of this Essay, Perry not only invites more
discussion about transracial adoption, but also urges broader consideration of
the needs and interests of all Black children. This section focuses on impor-
tant paradigm shifts in the field of adoption that pose challenges for legal
and social work professionals and also have important ramifications for
Black children, the Black family, and the Black community.
A. Adoption: Then and Now
Two crucial paradigm shifts have occurred in the field of adoption.
First, the adoption process formerly focused on the interests of children, serv-
ing as a specialized welfare service for the child in need of a permanent
home. Today, the focus has shifted to serving adults who seek to parent.
Second, adoption professionals are no longer predominantly social workers.
the relationship between race, class, genes, and intelligence, Carl Rowan noted:
My home state, Tennessee, had a constitution forbidding "the intermarriage of white
persons with Negroes, mulattos, or persons of mixed blood, descended from a Ne-
gro to the third generation." The penalty for such miscegenation was up to five
years in prison.
The wording of that old Tennessee law reminds us that in most of America a
person can have 87.5 percent "white blood" but society still considers and treats
them as "blacks," and even as pariahs.
Carl T. Rowan, That Powerful 'Black Blood,' BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 28, 1994, at 19A. But see supra
notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
It has been noted that once again, "more very young babies of African-American and
mixed-race heritage fare being] adopted by white couples." McKenzie, supra note 41, at 72.
McKenzie further notes:
According to NACAC's [North American Council on Adoptable Children] study on
"Barriers to Same Race Placements," of the 47 traditional agencies that do not spe-
cialize in special needs adoption, 49% of placements of African-American children
and 70% of placements of Hispanic children were transracial adoptions. This was in
contrast to a 6% transracial adoption rate in specialized agencies and a 9% rate in
public agencies.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
102. McKenzie, supra note 41, at 72.
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Now lawyers are often the key players, asserting that their clients have a
legal right to adopt.
1. Historical Review of Adoption Practices. For nearly 150 years, adoption
in the United States has been governed by state statutes. Before 1851, adop-
tion was "a private legal act, like a conveyance of real estate or a commer-
cial contractual transaction."" A guardian might be named in a will, or
petitions of adoption and name changes were filed as special state legislative
bills. In 1851, Massachusetts enacted the first "modern" state adoption stat-
ute,104 rendering public what had been a private arrangement by requiring
judicial supervision and approval of adoptions.
From 1851 until the 1950s, adoption evolved both as a statutory process
and as a child welfare service. By 1929, all states had enacted some form of
adoption legislation. Typically, these statutes required: (1) consent of the birth
parent or guardian (and of the child, over age twelve to fourteen); (2) an
investigation (or social study) conducted by the placing agency to determine
the suitability of the prospective home; (3) a probationary trial period in the
adoptive home under appropriate supervision; (4) issuance of a final decree,
withheld until a court received evidence of satisfactory adjustment of adop-
tive parents and child to each other; and (5) secrecy of the legal proceedings
and provision for alteration of the child's birth certificate." This adoption
process was thought to protect "children against being adopted by un-
suitable persons, being casually removed from their natural parents, or being
improvidently transferred by their parents into the custody of others.""04
The dominant professionals in the adoption process were social workers-the
staffs of public and private licensed child welfare agencies, many of which
were church-related. As trained child welfare specialists, they conducted
investigatory home studies and supervised probationary trial placements."
By the mid-1950s, intake policies of many agencies effectively limited
adoption to the "perfect" or "near perfect" baby. The perfect baby typically
was a healthy white infant, born out-of-wedlock, and relinquished at birth or
shortly thereafter by a mother reluctant to face the disapproval of family and
community by attempting to rear the child as a single parent. Agencies
placed great emphasis on matching an infant with an adoptive family in
terms of appearance, religion, ethnicity, and presumed IQ potential. The
typical, "perfect" prospective adoptive couple was infertile, well-adjusted,
well-established in their community and careers, and financially stable; in
103. Sanford N. Katz, Rewriting the Adoption Story, FAM. ADVOC., Summer 1982, at 9, 9.
104. See Howe, supra note 79, at 175-76 (citing Joseph Ben-Or, The Law of Adoption in the
United States: Its Massachusetts Origins and the Statute of 1851, 130 NEw ENG. HisT. & GENEA-
LOGICAL REG. 259-72 (1976)).
105. Id. at 178.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Law and practice tried to mirror biology. The traditional "notion [was] that the adopt-
ed child, by physical appearance alone, could have been the birth child of the adoptive par-
ents. The adoptive parents were supposed to be people who, by physical appearance and
ages could have conceived the infant." Katz, supra note 103, at 9.
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other words, they were solid, middle-class, and white. These agency
practices, coupled with a decline in births during and immediately after
World War II, led to the development of very high-priced "black markets"
in independent or private adoption-the focus of 1955 Senate hearings
chaired by Senator Kefauver.w
2. The Pendulum Swings Back. For decades now, the demand for
healthy, white infants has consistently exceeded the numbers available for
adoption. As the shortage of infants increased, some infertile couples turned
to nontraditional sources, such as transracial and international adoptions.
Others entered into surrogate parenting arrangements or attempted to use
some form of alternative means of reproduction, such as artificial insemina-
tion, in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, or ovum donation.
10
Now, in the mid-1990s, a new generation of private services and net-
works has sprung up to help bring together a relinquishing parent or willing
surrogate with a prospective adopter."' Often these placements are deemed
to be "open" rather than "closed" because the parties know each other and
many expect to maintain ongoing relationships."2 The key professionals in-
volved are typically lawyers, doctors, or other intermediaries, who seek to
help an adult client achieve the goal of becoming a parent. The primary task
of these new services is to find adoptable babies for childless adults, rather
than to find homes for dependent, mistreated, and abused children. Less
"desirable" children remain the charges of public agencies and private agen-
cies servicing children in publicly-financed foster care.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) Uniform Adoption Act,"' finalized at the Conference's August
109. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
110. For a summary review of the new reproductive technology, see NCFA FACTBOOK,
supra note 46, at 152-59. It may appear that the incidence of infertility is on the rise, but it is
more likely that the number of couples with fertility impairments has not grown. Instead,
growth has occurred in the number of couples who seek medical solutions to this problem.
See id. at 152.
111. According to William L. Pierce, President of the National Committee for Adoption
(NCFA), in some parts of the country, such as California, persons calling themselves adoption
consultants operate without any professional oversight and have developed new strategies for
bringing parties together, including franchising their services. One such person is Bruce M.
Rappaport, Ph.D., founder and Executive Director of the Independent Adoption Center in
Pleasant Hill, California, and founder of the National Federation for Open Adoption Educa-
tion. See infra note 131. Mr. Pierce also stated that "if one looks closely at new adoption
agencies, one sees that a large percentage are headed by lawyers and receive a large number
of referrals from lawyers in private practice." Telephone Interview with William L. Pierce,
President, NCFA (Dec. 1, 1994).
112. See LINcoLN CAPLAN, AN OPEN ADOPTION (1990) (true story illuminating psychological
challenges and rewards of open adoption arranged through a lawyer); Annette Baran &
Reuben Pannor, Perspectives on Open Adoption, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 119
(adoption issue).
113. UNiF. ADOPTION ACT (1994). For text of the Act, see 20 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2033
(Sept. 20, 1994). Full text, with Prefatory Note and Comments, may be obtained from the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See also Susan Chira, Law
Proposed to End Adoption Horror Stories, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at A12 (summarizing major
features of the UAA and presenting contrasting opinions).
152 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 2:131 1995
1994 Annual Meeting, is viewed by some as a triumph for the assertive
private adoption bar."" In my opinion, adoption lawyers have been relent-
lessly attempting to establish dominance in the adoption field for more than
a decade in order to meet the desires of adult clients seeking to adopt
healthy infants.
B. Challenges Posed by Paradigm Shifts
1. New Questions Regarding a Constitutional Right to Adopt. What does
this paradigm shift in focus from meeting a child's need for an adoptive
home to an adult's desire to parent mean for legal practitioners and theo-
rists? Advocates of transracial adoption question the constitutionality of stat-
utory same-race preference schemes and agency practices." s But do adult
114. In contrast, there is almost unanimous concern among child welfare professionals that
the philosophical orientation of the approved Uniform Adoption Act focuses exclusively on
the rights of adults to adopt children, rather than on adoption as a service for children deliv-
ered with attention to according fairness to all three parties in the adoption triad. Ann
Sullivan, Adoption Program Director of Child Welfare League of America (CWLA), stated:
As many of you know, the proposed uniform adoption act was approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) at their
annual meeting in early August. This was done in spite of the thousands of letters
of opposition sent to NCCUSL by CWLA member agencies and others. The national
organizations on record as opposing this act include: Child Welfare League of
America, National Association of Social Workers, Adoptive Families of America,
Catholic Charities USA, American Adoption Congress, Concerned United
Birthparents, National Adoption Center, Adoption Exchange Association, Children
Awaiting Parents, and the Joint Council on International Children's Services. To our
knowledge, it is the first time in history that major national organizations represent-
ing all members of the adoption triad have joined together in such a manner.
Memorandum from Ann Sullivan to Individuals Requesting Information about the Uniform
Adoption Act 1 (Sept. 27, 1994) (on file with author).
115. See Bartholet, supra note 4, at 1226-45; Rosettenstein, supra note 5, at 167-97; cf. supra
note 16. But cf. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage Of Good Intentions
With Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593 (1994) (arguing that Shaw is
fundamentally flawed and asserting the North Carolina majority-minority voting district will
meet the burdens of strict scrutiny). Judge Higginbotham and his co-authors state: "The Su-
preme Court's majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno, applying the Equal Protection Clause to
preclude African-Americans from attaining significant political power in this nation, turns the
intent and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment on its head." Id. at 1645.
From my perspective, claiming that same-race preference statutory schemes or agency
practices violate the Equal Protection rights of prospective white adopters is a similar perver-
sion of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such claims completely ignore the historical context and
purpose to which these authors refer so eloquently:
In the 1873 case first construing the Fourteenth Amendment, the Slaughter-house
Cases, the Supreme Court declared:
We repeat, . . .no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading pur-
pose found in [the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments], lying
at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been
even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman
and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlim-
ited dominion over him.
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by
way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so
clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would
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prospective adopters have a constitutional "right to adopt" any
child-including a child whose racial and ethnic heritage is different from
their own?
Currently, no such constitutional right to adopt exists. Although the
U.S. Constitution does not explicitly mention parents or families, courts have
expansively interpreted substantive rights"6 protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."7 For more than seventy years, the
Supreme Court has defined "liberty" to include the right "to marry, establish
a home and bring up children.""' The Court has described the custody
rights of parents to be "far more precious ... than property rights.""9 In
its 1972 landmark Stanley decision, the Court stated: "[i]t is plain that the
interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of
his or her children 'come(s) to this Court with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting
economic arrangements. ' ""
Nevertheless, under the common-law concept of parens patriae, parents'
substantive rights to the custody and control of their child may be subordi-
nated to the state's interest in the child's welfare. In resolving conflicts be-
be necessary for its application to any other.
Now, 120 years after the Slaughter-house Cases, the Fourteenth Amendment may
be used to thwart rather than to assure effective use of the ballot by African-Ameri-
cans. Now, ninety years after George White [the last Reconstruction Era African-
American to serve from North Carolina] was driven from Congress, the Fourteenth
Amendment may be used to undermine rather than to guarantee the racial plural-
ism that has been occurring in the Congress.
Id. at 1645-46 (footnotes omitted).
I strongly concur that "[t]he Supreme Court's voting rights law should not be based on
a politically appealing dream that denies all of American history. The law should not distort
that history such that the concept of 'colorblindness' is used-like a surgeon's scalpel-to
excise African-Americans from significant political power." Id. at 1630. Preserving and protect-
ing strong Black families and Black communities is as important to me as promoting maxi-
mum political participation and racial pluralism in Congress. For further discussion, see infra
part W.C.
116. These include two distinct due process rights: a substantive right protecting an
individual's liberty or property interests and a procedural right requiring that notice and a
hearing be held before the government can take away a protected interest.
The Equal Protection Clause requires that legislation must operate equally upon all
similarly-situated members of a group that is defined reasonably and according to a proper
legislative purpose. For further discussion, see Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Legal Rights and Obliga-
tions: An Uneven Evolution, in YOUNG UNWED FATHERS: CHANGING ROLES AND EMERGING POLI-
CIES 141, 145-49 (Robert I. Lerman & Theodora J. Ooms eds., 1993).
117. See, e.g., Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990). The court noted that.
The Supreme Court has expanded the definition of "liberty" beyond the core textual
meaning of that term to include interests arising from the specific privileges enumer-
ated by the Bill of Rights, and from the "fundamental rights implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" under
the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 1435 (citations omitted).
118. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
119. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
120. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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tween parental rights and the state's interest in the welfare of a child, courts
apply a "best interest of the child" standard.21
With respect to proceedings concerning a parent-child relationship, the
procedural aspect of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
at a bare minimum, has been held to prohibit a state from denying notice
and an opportunity to be heard to someone who has a liberty interest in the
relationship. With respect to procedural matters, the Supreme Court applies
the balancing approach articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge." The Court, de-
pending on the time, place, and circumstances of the particular case before
it, has reached seemingly conflicting conclusions."
Due to its reluctance to expand the category of liberty interest, the Su-
preme Court has never declared a fundamental right to adopt. In fact, lower
courts have concluded that "[a]lthough the Supreme Court has rendered
decisions defining various elements of family relationships as 'fundamental
interests,' none of those cases announced a 'fundamental interest' in adopt-
ing children." 4 In Griffith v. Johnston, after raising a number of questions
about the consequences that would flow from recognizing a "fundamental
interest" in adopting children, the Fifth Circuit concluded:
To assert that such an individualized "fundamental right" exists is
sloganistic and oxymoronic, since society must balance the interests of at
121. "Nearly all judicial discussion of custody cases begins with the statement that custody
must be so awarded as to promote the child's best interests .... [W]hen the child's welfare
seems to conflict with the claims of one or both parents, the child's welfare must prevail."
CLARK, supra note 59, § 19.1.
122. To determine what procedural due process is required in a particular case, the Su-
preme Court, since Mathews v. Eldridge, has weighed and considered three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (emphases added).
123. Compare Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981)
(concluding that lack of appointed counsel for incarcerated mother during proceeding to ter-
minate her parental rights did not render proceedings fundamentally unfair) with Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (holding denial of free blood tests to indigent defendants in
paternity actions would abridge due process, as parent-child relationship is at issue) and
Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 580 (1987) (affirming Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's ruling
that preponderance standard was constitutionally permissible in paternity proceedings because
"the putative father has no legitimate right and certainly no liberty interest in avoiding finan-
cial obligations ... validly imposed by state law") with Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982) (concluding that established legal parent-child relationship was entitled to due process
protection and requiting state to show by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed
to justify termination).
124. Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1437 (5th Cir. 1990); see id. at 1437 n.5 (citing a
long list of Supreme Court cases including Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)); see
also Lehr v. Robertson, 462 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1983); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-64
(1982); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46
(1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977) (plurality opinion); Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1943).
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least three parties-birth parents, child, adoptive parents-when legitimating
adoptions. The Griffith parents do not pose these questions, but they seem
to be the inevitable result of a determination that adoption is a
"fundamental right." Bearing in mind Justice White's admonition against the
creation of novel fundamental rights, we cannot recognize a "fundamental
right" to adopt a child."a
The parents' complaints against the Texas Department of Human Servic-
es in Griffith involved allegations that they had been denied information that
might have helped them make more informed decisions about adopting their
children."2 They further complained that the department had not provided
them with enough training or services. According to the Fifth Circuit, the
Griffiths' constitutional claims:
[S]tarkly raise[d] the distinction between governmental interference and gov-
ernmental assistance as a basis for Due Process relief... . "The [Due Pro-
cess] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security .... [I]ts lan-
guage cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the
State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other
m eans ,,.
Not only was the Fifth Circuit unwilling to recognize adoption as a funda-
mental right in Grffith v. Johnston, but the court also refused to impose any
new obligations on the state to provide post-adoption assistance to those
who adopt children with special needs."2
2. Practice Ethics and Knowledge-Based Skills. In my opinion, there are
also professional and ethical challenges for an attorney who elects to aid an
adult client seeking to become a parent. The adult may be the paying client,
but does the attorney, as an officer of the court and as a public citizen, have
any obligation to promote and protect the "best interests" of the adoptee?
These questions require close consideration, as a new network of private
services and agencies springs up, one in which lawyers play dominant roles
in bringing together relinquishing parents and prospective adopters. Given
the importance of the "best interests of the child" standard in adoption, are
there not potential conflicts of interest or professional malpractice problems
lurking in the background? Also, does the lawyer possess the requisite skills
to counsel and advise his or her client competently? What does the lawyer
need to know in order to help the client make an informed decision that
appropriately recognizes and balances the unique individual needs of a pro-
125. Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1437.
126. Id. at 1432. The Griffiths, adoptive parents of special-needs children, filed a civil rights
action against the Texas Department of Human Services (TDHS), alleging violation of their
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. The district court dismissed the
constitutional claims without prejudice. The Fifth Circuit, affirming the lower court dismissal,
held that appellants had failed to establish a cognizable "liberty or property interest" within
the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1441.
127. Id. at 1438 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989)
(citations omitted)).
128. Id. at 1437, 1439-40.
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spective adoptee and the client's desires to parent? Should the attorney be
concerned about whether the adult client possesses the appropriate skills to
meet the needs of the individual child?
One must also ask what the paradigm shift means for the profession of
social work, especially child welfare specialists. Mark T. McDermott, former
president of the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys, asserts that
social work agencies need to recognize that their practices have contributed
to why so many birth mothers today choose independent adoption over a
voluntary relinquishment to an agency. He stresses that "it is not the adop-
tive parents, but the birthparents, who have the practical ability to make
independent adoption exist. If all birthparents were to choose agency adop-
tion, there would be no independent adoption."'" However, birth parents
consistently report choosing independent adoption because they have:
(1) a perception.., that agencies are profit oriented and bureaucratic in
their treatment of birthparents, (2) a desire . .. to play an active role in the
selection of the adoptive parents, and (3) a desire ... for the child to go
directly into the physical custody of the adoptive parents rather than into
temporary foster care.'"
From this, one could conclude that social work has become irrele-
vant--outmaneuvered by new, more effective marketing strategies that result
in the placement of healthy infants with adults who are able to pay whatev-
er fees and costs are demanded.'
However, L. Jean Emery, former director of the Child Welfare League
of America's Adoption Program, argues the case for agency adoption. She
asserts that agency practices have changed and are still evolving "[a]s all of
society has become less punitive toward young unmarried pregnant women,
agencies have ... become more sensitive to their probable vacillations and
better listeners to their expressed needs."'32 To illustrate this evolution, Em-
ery notes:
Many of those who choose adoption now show an interest in openness in
the adoption process, and agencies make every effort to offer open or
semiopen adoptive service. Agencies can help ensure that the degree of
openness is arrived at by mutual consent, based on a thoughtful, informed
decision-making process by the birthparents, the prospective parents, and the
child when appropriate."n
Some public and traditional private social work agencies may have
developed protocols for working with unmarried mothers as described by
Emery. However, most public and traditional private social work agencies
today serve a growing population of youngsters who come into care, not as
129. McDermott, supra 82, at 146.
130. Id. at 147.
131. But cf. id. at 146-47; see also BRUCE M. RAPPAPORT, THE OPEN ADOPTION BOOK: A
GUIDE TO ADOPIrON WImoTU TEARS (1992) (arguing that open adoption is healthiest, most
humane, and fastest method available).
132. L. Jean Emery, Agency Versus Independent Adoption: The Case for Agency Adoption, THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 139, 143 (adoption issue).
133. Id.
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voluntarily relinquished, healthy newborns, but as older children, perma-
nently separated from their birth families as a result of state intervention
that may end in an involuntary termination of parental rights.TM Increasing-
ly, the majority of these youngsters are classified as having special needs."
According to Judith K. McKenzie, Executive Director of Spaulding For Chil-
dren, Inc., National Resource Center for Special Needs Adoption, "[c]hildren
of color are overrepresented in these statistics, and are known to wait longer
than Caucasian children for adoption, if and when they are targeted for this
service.""
Some social work specialists, like McKenzie, forthrightly acknowledge
the historical difficulty of finding appropriate homes for the increasing num-
bers of children of color, in the field of special needs, who wait for adop-
tion. She observes that not just recruitment, but the active development of
"families for these children who cannot be adopted by relatives or foster
parents is becoming increasingly difficult and is an important challenge to be
faced." 37 McKenzie further concedes:
Despite ... very significant changes in racial demographics and needs
of children and families, most agencies are doing very little to train current
staff in cultural competence or to recruit new minority staff to respond to
these changes. Throughout the country, the adoption workforce continues to
be primarily white and female in both public and private adoption pro-
grams.3
Social work agencies have not responded to demographic changes. This
is in sharp contrast to what is occurring in business circles. Businesses that
target Blacks as a market are advised that if they want their products to
move, they must understand that "African Americans are not like white
consumers with darker skin. Blacks and whites display profound differences
in language use, tastes, and product preferences."' Eugene Morris, presi-
dent of E. Morris Ltd. in Chicago, Illinois, cautions business leaders against
assuming that Blacks who see their advertising messages perceive them "in
the same way as whites. Advertisers who want to maintain or strengthen
sales in black markets must make a special effort to reach this market.""4°
134. See supra text accompanying note 59-61.
135. McKenzie claims that "[tlhese children [become] labeled as 'special needs' not because
of a physical or mental disability, although some of the children do have developmental dis-
abilities, but because, through default of parents and bureaucracies, they have become wards
of the system." McKenzie, supra note 41, at 62.
136. Id. at 63. "Factors contributing to the delays include: inadequate legal resources for
child welfare cases; crowded court dockets, continuances and nonappearance hearings without
procedural documentation; [and] judicial biases or inaction." Id. at 68 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., BARRIERS TO FREEING CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION 1 (1991)).
137. Id. at 73.
138. Id. at 69 (citing James Rosenthal et al., Race, Social Class and Special Needs Adoption, 35
Soc. WORK 532 (1990)).
139. Eugene Morris, The Difference in Black and White Consumers, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Jan.
1993, at 44.
140. Id. at 49.
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Morris tells businesses that they "will be rewarded if they allow blacks to
express their own identity and treat black concerns with respect."'
In summary, social work agencies-public and private-have not re-
sponded well to the increasing number of Black children in foster care. They
largely have failed to employ Black professionals to help address the special
problems that Black children confront in our society. At the same time, as
the private sector moved into making transracial placements, most private
agencies have ignored the needs of the Black community and have not
worked in concert with it. Not only has the private sector ignored the Black
community, private agencies and independent professionals have ignored
other important issues as well, such as properly identifying who their clients
are and to whom they owe their loyalties.
C. What Is Needed to Meet These Challenges?
These paradigm shifts do not bode well for the Black family or the
Black community. The trends identified in Part 11, (1) disproportionately
large numbers of Black, older children entering the public foster care system,
and (2) more Black and biracial infants being placed through private inde-
pendent adoptions, are especially disconcerting." The messages transmitted
by these developments are very demeaning. If a group is denied the oppor-
tunity to rear its own, then it has no future.
1. Repudiating the Myth of a "Shortage of Black Adoptive Families." Afri-
can-Americans adopt at a higher rate than European Americans or Hispanic
families.' Moreover, "the National Urban League's Black Pulse Survey
revealed that three million (or one-third of) black household heads were
interested in formally adopting a black child;" M  this number far exceeds
the total number of Black children legally free for adoption. Given these
facts, I find it very difficult to accept as reality the frequently stated conclu-
sions about the nonexistence of Black homes.4
What seems more reasonable is the following explanation provided by
McKenzie:
Advocates of same-race/same-culture placements have concluded that this
development (i.e., transracial adoption) stems from culturally insensitive
and/or adoption-fee-driven practices. Many traditional adoption agencies,
which are staffed primarily by Caucasian administrators and workers and
which place mostly infants for fees, find themselves in the positions where
they have accepted custody of a minority child, even though they have no
waiting families of the child's race or culture. Because the main funding
141. Id. at 44.
142. See supra notes 69-72, 101 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
144. HILL ET AL., supra note 10.
145. For examples, see Bartholet, supra note 4, at 1188, 1251 n.245; Howard, supra note 10.
But see Zanita E. Fenton, In A World Not Their Own: The Adoption Of Black Children, 10 HARV.
BLACKLETrER J. 39, 44-45 (1993) (refuting claim of an insufficient number of Black adoptive
families).
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source for services to the mother and baby is ultimately the paying adoptive
parent, the agency places the child with a family that has already been
screened and is willing to pay the fee. It has been well documented that fee
practices are a disincentive to adopt for lower income and minority fami-
lies."4
Therefore, other factors block Black prospective parents from adopting; no
lack of interest in adopting exists on the part of Black adults.
To address these issues of cultural insensitivity and fee-driven practices,
social work agencies should recognize and remove the barriers that exist
between them and the Black community. Agencies should employ different
strategies and methods to increase the identification and processing of appro-
priate same-race homes for children of color. For example, state and private
agencies could forge more partnerships with minority agencies, churches,
and other community-based organizations. Definitions of family may need to
be enlarged to accommodate the Black family kinship structure which recog-
nizes both blood and nonblood relatives. Financial obstacles to grandparent,
kinship care, guardianship, and adoption may need to be removed or
eased. " 7 No appropriate individual should be excluded from adopting be-
cause of an inability to pay a private agency fee if a church or civic group
were willing and able to cover the fee on behalf of the individual.
2. Just Love Is Not Enough. As previously stated, the true outcomes of
transracial adoptive placements made during the 1960s have yet to be identi-
fied."4 An emerging body of clinical literature, to some extent drawing on
146. McKenzie, supra note 41, at 72 (citations omitted); see also Fenton, supra note 145, at
46 (arguing that agency practices reflect white middle-class values and exclude otherwise
viable Black families).
147. See generally Fenton, supra note 145, at 39 (describing origins of child welfare-system
not originally created to meet needs of Black children and urging current administrators to
employ selection criteria more consistent with Black cultural patterns).
148. See supra note 20. Some therapists working with adult transracial adoptees today, such
as Rick Pinderhughes of The Pre/Post Adoption Consulting Team (PACT) of Center for Fam-
ily Connections (formerly The Family Center, Inc.), in Cambridge, Massachusetts, recognize
that "[t]he issue of dislocation and the sensitive matters of identity involved in any adoption,
acquire an added spin when the parents are of one race and the adopted children are of an-
other." Mopsy S. Kennedy, Trans-racial Adoptions: an Interview with Rick Pinderhughes, 2 PEPsi'.
(The Family Ctr., Inc., Somerville, Mass.), 1994, at 4, 4. Mr. Pinderhughes, a doctoral candi-
date at the Massachusetts School of Professional Psychology, is conducting a study of African-
American and biracial individuals of African-American descent, 26 years or older, who were
adopted before the age of 2 into a white family. Through interviews and an anonymous
questionnaire, he is discovering that "It]here's a tremendous struggle, well into their twenties,
and sometimes at the border of turning thirty, for these adoptees. Along with the adoption
issues, there's the racial piece .... This is an aspect of their life which may have been quite
buried, or at least not highlighted." Id.
Dr. Robert T. Carter, a professor of sociology and education at Teachers College of
Columbia University, also is conducting a study on transracial and biracial identity develop-
ment. He is finding that "some adoptees who seem well-adjusted and productive feel racially
incomplete and struggle to find a nexus to make them whole .... [They] still wrestle in
their 20's and 30's with prejudice and other race-related experiences that many other blacks
began dealing with in their adolescence and teens." Lena Williams, Beyond 'Losing Isaiah.
Truth in Shades of Gray, N.Y. TUIMES (Late Ed.), Mar. 23, 1995, at C1, C4.
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the study of biracial adults and teens, is beginning to recognize and address
the additional problems and pain these individuals encounter as they move
into adulthood.49 It would appear that "a loving home" and "loving par-
ents" may not be enough within a society such as ours where diversity and
difference are not honored, but denigrated. More care, not less, needs to be
given to assessing the appropriateness of placing a Black child with parents
of another race. The way a child is reared and socialized can ensure that the
child, as an adult, is either in or out of touch with his or her social and
racial reality. To ignore this fact is irresponsible. Much more needs to be
understood about challenges or dilemmas encountered by the person who,
because of physical appearance, is deemed by others to be Black, but who, if
reared by whites without any close or intimate affiliations with Blacks, is
socialized to be white.
The poignancy of this dilemma was brought home to me last year
while reading law school applications. A young man in his personal state-
ment identified himself as having been adopted and reared by white parents,
with white siblings and mostly all white friends. He described himself as a
Black man in a white middle class world, reared in it and by it, yet not
truly a part of it. His skin told those whom he encountered that he was
Black at first glance, before his personality-shaped by his upbringing and
experiences-came into play. For him, the dilemma was: "how can I be
Black when Black culture and relations have forged so little of my persona?
How can I be white when my skin dictates otherwise? How in truth am I to
envision myself? Do I consider myself white or Black?"
Interracial marriages are increasing and attitudes among the younger
generations are changing."S Yet, it is one thing for an adult to choose to
enter into an interracial or interreligious marriage or relationship, or even to
elect deliberately not to identify with one's racial or ethnic group. Those are
adult decisions. The biracial child of an intact family has the opportunity to
be connected through each parent to her mixed heritage without any cloud
of uncertainty or feelings of abandonment so frequently a part of the adop-
tive experience. The question I find most troubling is whether it is appropri-
ate, fair, and equitable virtually to eliminate a full range of future choices
and to create difficult obstacles for the Black child adoptee who, as an adult,
may have to cope with a social experience and psychic15 incongruity simi-
lar to that described by the law school applicant?
Some transracial adoption advocates sharply criticize the Multiethnic
Placement Act of 1994 because it does not absolutely eliminate race from
placement considerations. 2 Senator Metzenbaum, the Act's major sponsor,
reportedly now favors its repeal, predicting that instead of rescuing children
149. See generally RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA (Marcia P.P. Root ed., 1992); Jewelle
T. Gibbs & Gloria Moskowitz-Sweet, Clinical and Cultural Issues in the Treatment of Biracial and
Bicultural Adolescents, 72 FAMILIES Soc'Y: J. CONTEMP. HuM. SERVIcEs 579 (1991).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 89-99.
151. I use the word "psychic" to refer to a full spectrum of both mystical beliefs as well
as cognitive understandings.
152. Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382,
551-54, 108 Stat. 3518, 4056-57 (1994) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5115a) [hereinafter MPA].
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from years in the foster care system, it may ultimately do more harm than
good.1" Agencies and courts may still consider cultural or racial identity
needs of a child and a prospective foster or adoptive parent's ability to meet
those needs." The Act provides no guidance for determining what weight
race should be given. In my opinion, its major drawback is the lack of any
financial resources to ensure implementation of the mandate for "diligent
recruitment of potential foster and adoptive families that reflect the ethnic
and racial diversity of children in the State for whom foster and adoptive
homes are needed."'5
What is sorely needed to meet the challenges posed by the paradigm
shifts in the field of adoption? In the words of McKenzie:
A new breed of leaders... in child welfare who will carry their mis-
sion and commitment to family preservation into their everyday work with
birthfamilies, kinship families, foster families, and adoptive families. They
will value diversity and work toward developing culturally competent orga-
nizations to better serve those families and children who most need them.
Many of the new leaders should be persons of color."
In my opinion, the most critical need is for professionals, in either social
work or law, whether they be Black or white, to commit to serve the Black
communities and families with which they work. Professionals must respect
and enhance existing strengths and empower individuals and groups to ad-
dress and overcome problems.
V. CONCLUSION
The transracial adoption controversy needs to be redefined. I urge oth-
ers to reexamine the discourse about transracial adoption and to consider
closely what is currently happening as a consequence of the general shift in
focus from meeting the needs of children for permanent homes to satisfying
the desires of adults to become parents. The needs and interests of Black
children, Black families, and Black communities are being ignored. The stage
cannot truly be set to meet and advance these needs or interests if a consti-
tutional "right to adopt" were to be recognized. Nor would these be met if
the House Welfare Reform Bill,17 passed and forwarded to the Senate in
late March 1995, containing a blanket prohibition against all consideration of
race in placement, were enacted into law and the size and composition of
the country's foster care population remained the same." To set the stage
for meeting the needs of Black children and advancing the interests of Black
families and communities, the problem must be accurately assessed. A range
of possible responses must be identified and considered, followed by the
153. See Albert R. Hunt, The Republicans Seize the High Ground on Transracial Adoptions,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1995, at A19.
154. MPA, supra note 152, § 553.
155. Id. § 554.
156. McKenzie, supra note 41, at 75.
157. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1995).
158. See Marilyn Elias, Interracial Adoption Policy Colored by Controversy, USA TODAY, Mar.
28, 1995, at 8D.
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selection and implementation of an agreed strategy which can be evaluated
and modified as necessary."
Transracial adoption, as a response to the disproportionate numbers of
Black children who enter and remain in the foster care system longer than
white children, is a classic example of embracing and promoting a solution
without accurately defining the problem."W The true history of adoption in
the United States, as a specialized child welfare service, includes the devel-
opment of agencies and private intermediaries who primarily placed white
infants with white, infertile parents.'61 The standards and protocols adopted
were meant to be exclusive-to screen more applicants out than in. The aim
was to match the "perfect" infant with the "perfect" white, infertile cou-
ple.16 2
During the 1960s and 1970s, public and private agencies moved
incrementally into Black adoptions when various social phenomena" creat-
ed changes in the pool of children available for adoption. Often, these place-
ments were made without the benefit of any changes in staff, policies, or
protocols for recruiting and approving applicants. Generally, no meaningful
use was made of existing organizational resources in Black communities.'
In my opinion, it is deceitful to assert that not enough appropriate Black
homes exist. This myth covers up the incompetence or disinterest of the
child welfare community which initially accepted transracial adoption as the
appropriate solution, given the large numbers of approved white applicants
for whom no infants existed.'6
Regrettably, there was and has been little aggressive movement to fash-
ion culturally sensitive services and strategies to meet the needs of the grow-
ing number of Black children in foster care. Public and private agencies have
159. For description of a six stage rational problem-solving process, involving: (1) problem
identification; (2) a diagnostic phase; (3) generation of alternatives; (4) selecting solutions; (5)
implementation; and (6) evaluation and adjustment, see RODNEY W. NAPIER & MATTI K.
GERSHENFELD, GROUPS: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 338-42 (5th ed. 1993).
160. For discussion about the importance of accurate and comprehensive problem defini-
tion, see LUTHER H. GULICK, THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM AND AMERICAN IDEAS 24 (1966)
("Once an indivisible problem is divided, nothing effective can be done about it.").
161. See Fenton, supra note 145, at 39-42; supra note 40.
162. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
163. See supra part III; see also supra note 50.
164. One student commentator notes:
Unfortunately, the system of social services has not been redesigned to accommodate
the special needs of Black children .... The short supply of services available must
be more focused for efficiency and effectiveness by at least re-evaluating the current
formal adoption system to encompass the needs of Black children.
Fenton, supra note 145, at 39-40.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 144-46; see also Fenton, supra note 145, at 44-46. It
should be noted that during the 1970s, traditional, private child welfare agencies began to
undergo a transformation. As donations from private fundraising dropped, but overhead oper-
ating expenses climbed, they began to enter into contracts for service with state social service
departments and/or sought to receive federal grant money. As the federal Children's Bureau
focused attention on meeting the needs of children with special needs through the promotion
of subsidized adoption and permanency planning, many agencies started to compete for feder-
al grants or state service contracts as a way to cover their budgets and stay in business.
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formed few working partnerships with organizations and institutions within
the Black community. Such partnerships, predicated on respect for the exper-
tise of Black child development professionals and the overall integrity and
dignity of the Black community, would accord opportunities for participation
in a thoughtful process of problem definition, identification, and brainstorm-
ing to generate viable alternative strategies and selection of models to be
trial-tested.
As we move into the latter half of the 1990s, it appears that a new
source of infants may again be available, given the rising number of multira-
cial births-an especially high percentage of which are Black/white mixed
children. I fear that these biracial children, not unlike my slave ancestors
who suffered the indignities of being publicly auctioned, privately exchanged
as part of a commercial transaction, or transferred under the terms of a
deceased master's will, will become prized commodities, available to eager,
desperate consumers for a fee, through emerging adoption networks and
services.
Transracial adoption raises many issues that highlight the continuing
American societal dilemma of unresolved problems of race and inequality.
The differing perspectives identified by Perry of colorblind individualism
and color and community consciousness are like responses to an "indivisible
problem 1 that mask the full complexity of the situation and prevent any
meaningful solution from being achieved. If race were completely eliminated
from all adoptive decision-making, the critical question would then be how
to assure all approved applicants-Black, white, or "other"-equal access to
all children-Black, white, or "other.'"7 At this time, however,- there is a
crucial need to find ways to provide Black children generally, and those in
foster care particularly, with the kind of rearing and nurturing that will
enable them, when grown, to participate in and contribute to our democratic
society as productive adults. This is the challenge for Black families, the
Black community, and American society at large. Community groups and
organizations of all types within the Black community must become better
informed about the need to seek inclusion in the planning and delivery of
services for children and families.
During the height of the Civil Rights movement, much attention was
given to issues of voting, education, jobs, and housing. These were all areas
in which Blacks suffered grievous discrimination. But denial of opportunities
in these areas did not threaten the continued integrity of the Black commu-
nity as directly as does a policy endorsing wholesale, unregulated, transracial
placements. Such a policy today is an assault that disempowers Black fami-
lies, undermines the future viability of Blacks to participate in our pluralistic
democracy, and runs the further risk of creating effete individuals."
166. See GULICK, supra note 160.
167. See supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
168. In my opinion, groups and group affiliations are important not only in American
politics, but in the workplace as well. The person who is perceived as not having a strong
persona or group affiliation often suffers ridicule.
164 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY
I acknowledge that in some instances a transracial adoption may be an
appropriate placement for a specific child. Also, I do not argue that a family
of another race could never successfully rear a Black child. Instead, it is my
hope that from continued open dialogue and discussion, new understandings
can be achieved. Efforts must be undertaken to develop mechanisms for
identifying and selecting the most appropriate adults to parent Black chil-
dren in need of families.
Prospective adopters of a Black child, if nonblack, should be willing and
prepared to provide the child with a real day-to-day living experience within
a community setting that allows the child to have affiliations and associa-
tions with other children and adults of African-American descent. To avert
the dilemma of the law school applicant, nonblack, adoptive parents who
step forward to rear a Black child should have the courage to live in a Black
community or a truly diverse community, not a homogenized, "lily-white"
enclave of privilege and exclusion or in an area unpopulated by Blacks. In
order to grow to productive adulthood, the Black child will need more than
a storybook adventure or periodic museum excursion to acquire knowledge
of and a positive feeling for his or her genetic inheritance, reference group
affiliation, and social and cultural history.
To feel comfortable with one's racial heritage and at peace with one's
adopted family, a person should be positively socialized and supported by
family members who were consciously "culturally competent"69 about the
racial realities of life in the United States at the end of the twentieth century.
The child should have opportunities for institutional affiliations within the
Black community. A successful transracial adoption should permit the adopt-
ee an array of choices as an adult regarding the identifications and affilia-
tions he or she elects to pursue. This will only be possible if the child is
reared in a supportive environment, has positive, accepting experiences with
both Black and diverse persons and groups, and truly feels comfortable with
all.
Dr. Carter has stated that "'many transracial adoptees are psychologically marginal in
that they don't have an identity that is grounded in the experience, values or perceptions of
a particular group. They grow up denying they are a member of any particular racial group,
and there is a consequence.'" Williams, supra note 148, at C4.
169. Johnston notes that:
Developing cultural competence means being sensitive to the issues surround-
ing moving an Asian child to a rural American community. It means understanding
the problems inherent in sending an African-American child to an all white private
school. It means developing a willingness-no, an excited interest-in living in an
integrated community, eating ethnic foods, extending one's circle of support and
friendship to include people of color, and more. For most middle and upper middle
class people of European heritage, developing cultural competence will not be easy,
because the fact is that most of us are much more racist than we care to believe.
JOHNSTON, supra note 15, at 130.
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